GOD: SAVIOR, BUTCHER, OR OBLIVIOUS ARTIST?
THE THEODICY OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD
Laurence Rohrer
This paper is a critical examination of Alfred North Whitehead’s attempt to solve the traditional
problem of evil, and the correlative claim made by some process theologians who build on Whitehead,
that Whitehead’s theodicy is reconcilable with traditional Western theologies. Whitehead’s conception
of evil is crucial to his process cosmology because it is integral to his notion of creation in which evil is
understood as part of the larger dynamic of God’s creative activity. While Whitehead’s process theodicy
is interesting, he fails to successfully escape between the horns of the problem of evil as it is currently
conceived as a trilemma. Instead, Whitehead’s approach rejects at least two horns of the trilemma, and
his solution to the problem of evil is ambiguous, and lends itself to at least two different interpretations,
each resulting in the denial of at least one relation of the trilemma. Moreover, these interpretations raise
serious concerns for traditional theology. In the first part of my paper I briefly discuss the features of this
trilemma in relation to Whitehead’s conception of evil, and discuss a possible inconsistency with
Whitehead’s notion of the role that it plays in his metaphysics. In the second part of the paper I address
two different ways of viewing God relative to the concept of evil that Whitehead elucidates. Whitehead
is often criticized for treating evil as merely apparent. While some process philosophers, notably Maurice
Barineau, have defended Whitehead from this charge it can be shown that this is an implication of at least
one interpretation of his approach. On a second interpretation of Whitehead’s approach I show that
Whitehead’s remarks about God’s relation to evil can be interpreted in a manner that escapes the charge
that evil is not genuine, but contrary to the hopes of subsequent process theologians, not in a manner that
is reconcilable with the traditional theistic conception of God’s omnibenevolence.
Whitehead’s approach is an attempt to solve the problem of evil with a rational theodicy. By
“rational theodicy” I mean the attempt to account logically for the relationship between God and human
suffering that avoids inconsistencies and paradoxes. In the traditional problem, evil is commonly thought
to be inconsistent with either God’s omnibenevolence or God’s omnipotence, thus involving a destructive
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dilemma. However, some contemporary philosophers, such as Barineau, prefer to represent the problem
as a “trilemma” that occurs any time that three propositions are asserted to be true at the same time: evil
occurs, God is omnipotent, and God is omnibenevolent.62 Whenever we try to resolve the problem by
denying any of the three the propositions, we run into consequences that seem inconsistent with the
traditional conception of God.
P1

If evil occurs, then either God is not omnibenevolent or not omnipotent (the
traditional dilemma).

P2

If God is omnibenevolent and evil occurs, then either God is not omnipotent, or
evil is only apparent (genuine evil does not really exist).

P3

If God is omnipotent and evil occurs, then either evil is merely apparent, or God
is not omnibenevolent.

The common way to resolve the trilemma without denying any of the propositions is by
qualifying, i.e., redefining or supplementing one or more of the major terms. This has been the choice of
a number of contemporary philosophers.63 Some have asserted that the alleged contradictions involved in
the trilemma depend on the meaning assigned to the terms involved.64 For example, perhaps the most
popular way traditional theologians attack the problem is by arguing that while God allows evil despite
his omnipotence and goodness, evil is necessary for some greater purpose of God’s providence. Thus,
there are some logically necessary evils that serve a greater good. Since God could not will it otherwise,
and accomplish this greater good, God must allow these evils in order to be omnibenevolent. In the most
common approach God tolerates these evils in order to allow for human freedom, which it is assumed
requires that men must be able to disobey God’s will in order to be truly free, thus making moral evil a
necessary possibility.
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Another common way to attack the trilemma is to simply deny one of the propositions, e.g., that
evil does not actually exist. In this approach it is argued that all evils are merely apparent and that
genuine moral evil does not exist. Even though we may experience evil as genuine, if we had access to an
omniscient vantage point, we would see that these apparent evils are actually consistent with the greatest
good. It is sometimes added that humans do not have the intellectual capacity to understand the
relationship between God and evil, and thus we continue to experience evils as genuine.65 The problem
that is commonly pointed out with this approach is that it seems to make God oblivious to the individual
sufferings of humankind. Thus, the free-will approach discussed previously has been the more popular
approach in traditional theologies. Finally, other less traditional theodicies have attempted to solve the
problems by either denying God’s omnipotence or omnibenevolence. All attempts to grasp the bull by
the horns of the traditional dilemma present serious concerns for traditional theologies.
In examining Whitehead’s process theodicy we must pay close attention to the way he defines
both evil and the attributes of God in his process metaphysics. Two difficulties are immediately
encountered when interpreting Whitehead’s definition of evil. First, many of his remarks are somewhat
vague and highly abstract and must be contextualized and cross referenced in order to build a coherent
picture, and these remarks span several of his major works written over the course of his long career.
Nowhere do we get a succinct statement of his view. This has lead to many divergent readings of his
work.
In Religion in the Making, Whitehead examines the phenomena in which evil appears; “evil is
exhibited in physical suffering, mental suffering, and loss of the higher experience in favor of the lower
experience.”66 Whitehead further states that we must focus on the suffering sentient being and he does
not distinguish between natural evil on the one hand and moral evil on the other hand. Thus, Whitehead
has an affective notion of evil: evil is found in the painful experiences or experiences of loss of sentient
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beings. While some approaches to the problem of evil distinguish between natural and moral evils,
Whitehead argues that while evil is experienced with all the varied modalities of being, this does not
mean that there is a different type of evil for every modality. Furthermore, Whitehead asserts that while
evil is only found in the phenomena of suffering, the latter is not predicated on any notion of a
Metaphysical or primordial evil, such that the world is evil due to its temporal and finite nature, or that
there is destructive agency involved etc. Likewise, Whitehead rejects the notion of evil as privation of the
good. Evil is real, tangible, and affective because human suffering is real.
After determining the phenomena in which evil occurs, Whitehead attempts to generalize from
the various modalities, what he calls the “common character of evil.” He states that “the common
character of all evil is that its realization in fact involves that there is some concurrent realization of a
purpose towards elimination. The purpose is to secure the avoidance of evil.”67
In this way, Whitehead locates all evil in a single fulcrum point between the sentient being who suffers,
and the two purposes involved in the phenomenon at hand, including the goal of the perpetrator of the
action or the cause of the suffering. He explains this rather cryptic and ironic reference with an abstract
allusion to an act of moral evil. From the standpoint of the person who inflicts evil, the action is not evil,
rather it is good in as much as it accomplishes his purpose, hence Whitehead states, “evil triumphant in its
enjoyment, is so far good in itself; but beyond itself it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among
things greater than itself.”68 Thus, while evil may be subjectively perceived, the destructiveness of the
evil inflicted is an objective fact. Based on these remarks it would seem that evil is not relative in
Whitehead’s view. However, evil always appears in comparison to what could be and what is greater
than itself. Whitehead states that “in the summation of the more complete fact it [evil] has secured a
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descent towards nothingness, in contrast to the creativeness of what can without qualification be termed
good…evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative.”69
The next general trait of evil, according to Whitehead is that it contains an internal contradiction.
It is “unstable.” While this is implied in the remarks we just examined, this notion of instability is not
clearly spelled out. Though in and for itself evil is good, in so far as it is destructive, it eventually
destroys even its own forms of attainment. Thus, evil is self-destructive. Whitehead states that it
“promotes its own elimination by destruction, or degradation, or by elevation.”70 By elevation Whitehead
means the elevation of the agent of evil at the expense of others or of things greater than itself.
A third trait of evil is that it is a purely relational and relative concept at the metaphysical level in
process cosmology. It is this notion that we must most carefully examine and inquire whether it logically
coheres with his previous remarks regarding the objectivity of evil. Whitehead states that “it must be
noted that the state of degradation to which evil leads, when accomplished, is not in itself evil, except by
comparison with what might have been.”71 Hence evil is to be understood as a relation between what
potentially could have been, and what the destruction, called evil after the comparison, and brought about.
The medium of the relation is potentiality and the loss of creative potential and realized good remains of
those evil for others. The “evil lies in the loss of social environment,” according to Whitehead.72 When
we take these three general traits together we can infer that for Whitehead evil is a positive function of
material annihilation. In terms of his cosmology, in the process of creation and re-creation, evil is the
function of change via destruction, in contrast to the good which is positive and creative.
It should be clear from the remarks we have now examined that while Whitehead insists that there
are genuine evils from the standpoint of sentient beings, and that these same actions actually are also
ironically good in themselves, taken independently of the sufferer. While I think this is perhaps an apt
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description of what we would normally associate with the suffering caused by accidents and natural
hazards, such as tornados and earthquakes, that is, of natural evils, I am not convinced that this approach
presents a consistent picture of moral evils. How is an action such as torture, to be considered good for
the perpetrator? If the answer is that he takes pleasure in it, then first, it seems to imply a purely
hedonistic and relativistic approach to evil, and second, it seems certain that such acts will simply further
the moral deformation of the perpetrator, and this in itself is not good as Whitehead’s remarks seems to
suggest.

Moreover, because Whitehead’s cosmology involves evil as a function of change, this suggests

that at the metaphysical level, evil is merely apparent, since no greater stages of perfection could be
reached without such change. If so, then there seems to be an inconsistency in Whiteheads thinking about
evil between the metaphysical level, a God’s eye view of evil, and the human experience of moral evil.73
However, in order to address the fairness of this criticism we also must examine the way God operates in
Whitehead’s metaphysics, since God is the nexus of all change in Whitehead’s cosmology.
Whitehead describes God as a wholly immanent supratemporal being. God is an entity that enters
into each moment of creation and who “prehends” every actuality and the totality of all actualities of
existing things prior to their emergence into the actual occasions. Through this prehension God bridges
the gap between the eternal order of pure potentialities and the concrete actualities of the world. “The
abstract forms are thus the link between God and the actual world.” God is the creative force and term of
relation that brings potential being into fruition as concrete realities.74 It is important to note that God is
not transcendent in the traditional sense in Whitehead’s view. God is supratemporal, but not independent
of His creation. Temporal things arise by their participation in the things which are eternal and the process
in which this takes place requires a definite entity, namely God. However, God is not found in the
temporal order among things. Rather “God is the ground for concrete actuality.”75 Thus, God is the
Being who is the ground of all particular beings, and is not equivalent with any particular being, but is not
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as Aquinas and others argued, the ground of Being itself. God is an instance of creativity, like all other
actualities, but is not identified as creativity itself. For traditional theism, creativity is unified and
transcendent, for Whitehead and the subsequent process theists, it is pluralized and wholly immanent.76
Whitehead further postulates that God has three natures which are bound together in a single
unity; God’s primordial nature, consequent nature, and superject nature.77 God is primordial and
prefigures everything that becomes what it is by containing within Himself all eternal objects. In this
primordial nature God is infinite, however God is, like all of creation, in process, and thus God is not
complete. This marks another important difference between Whitehead’s view of God and that of
traditional Western theology. This is a point sometimes overlooked in subsequent works about
Whitehead.
By consequent nature, Whitehead means that God is an actual entity, that is, the temporal world
has an actual effect on God. In so far as creation is rooted in God, God shares in the experiences of the
world. The consequent nature begins in the sentient experience derived from the world which then
acquires synthesis in the primordial side of God’s nature. Each actual occasion of the world is thus
confronted with its own greatest potential. However, God does not determine which potentials will be
fully realized. In terms of human occasions, this means we are free to act on any of the potential
directions we can conceive. This notion of God’s consequent nature is one of the more controversial
points in Whitehead’s metaphysics. Again, by actual entity we cannot assume that Whitehead’s God is a
personal God. God’s metaphysical actuality is merely entailed by Whitehead’s claim that God is wholly
immanent. But “God” in Whitehead’s sense is not an entity in the complete sense; rather God is
represented as the “principle of concretion,” whereby actual processes in reality take their rise. God is
more like the glue that holds everything together as well as the source of the urge for everything that
exists to come into being, and their formal causation. But God does not create individual entities. It is in
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this sense that God does not provide efficient causation in Whitehead’s system; rather God and actual
entities change together in a kind of symbiotic relationship.
In so far as God is non-temporal, God’s nature is superject. By this Whitehead seems to mean
that God’s envisagement of the potentialities for the world becomes an object for the prehension of
emerging creations. In this way all things follow from the prehension of God, but God’s role is not in
Whitehead’s view, that of material causation. Rather, Whitehead sometimes speaks of God “persuading
force” in creation. Hence, it is due to God that a moral agent is presented with the choice between a truly
generative, creative act and a destructive creative act that may cause suffering, but God is not responsible
for the agent’s choice.
With these three natures in mind, we can see that in Whitehead’s theodicy evil occasions can not
take place outside of the God’s envisagement but must emerge, like all other occasions, as part of what is
prehended by God. At first blush this view seems to commit Whitehead to one of the relations of the
trilemma: If God is omnibenevolent, then why does He not envisage and prehend the world in such a way
that excludes the destructive element of evil? Since God does not, God is either not truly
omnibenevolent or God lacks the power to do so. Thus, it would seem that Whitehead can either deny
one of these propositions, or qualify them in some way. Whitehead already has qualified the notion of
evil, and he attempts to make a corresponding change in regard to the notion of omnipotence. God is all
powerful only in his primordial role as prehender of the forms, but God is incomplete in his consequent
nature. He considers that if “God be an actual entity which enters in every creative phrase and yet is
above change, He must be exempt from the internal inconstancy which is the true note of evil.”78 But we
should ask how God is exempt from this internal inconsistency in this view? How does God enter into all
events in which evil occurs and provides even the possibilities for such evils among all possibilities, and
yet be the entity who prehends things in their totality to their formal possibilities only?
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The usual move here, which Whitehead tries to avoid, is to simply say that all evil is merely
apparent, or that it is necessary for some greater good etc. Instead, Whitehead further modifies his idea of
evil. He distinguishes between two species of destruction, chaotic discord, and dominance of discord
which leads to complete destruction. According to Whitehead some degree of discord is necessary for the
introduction of change and novelty in the world. For this purpose destructive discord is necessary. If
creation did not involve change, the world would be static and not dynamic. This chaotic discord is not
evil in itself: rather it is evil only if there is a dominance of discord. The resultant destruction is evil in
the ultimate sense. Whitehead proposes that God in his primordial activity somehow reconciles all things
for the better. He calls this the “subjective aim of God.” In this role God is the care-taker of the temporal
world that picks up the pieces of human tragedy from the wreckage of the world that is consequent upon
chaotic discord. In the larger scheme of things, God is able to salvage the world and keep it harmonious.
Whitehead states
The wisdom of the subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be in such a
perfected system – its sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its triumphs, its immediacies of
joy – woven by rightness of feeling into the harmony of the universal feeling, which is
always immediate, always many, always one, always with novel advance, moving
onward and never perishing.79

At this point, it is important to consider what has happened to the concreteness of Whitehead’s initial
definition of evil, which he characterized as being very much a matter of the concrete experiences of
sentient individuals. This being the case, we should ask, what then of the victims of radical moral evil,
the tortured and murdered, the raped or oppressed? While Whitehead seems to console us by assuring us
that all things are prehended in such a way that things work out for the best, this abstract, metaphysical
solution does not address the individual lives and experiences that are destroyed by the dominance of
destruction of moral evils. Things work out for the best only in the totality of creation, not in the
salvation of individuals. In fact, sometimes Whitehead refers to the status of individual creations as
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“trivial.” It is at this point that Whitehead’s theodicy completely loses connection with traditional
theologies. He further states that such events are not preventable by God, but maintains that God can
nonetheless transform the world to greater ends by absorbing the extrinsic ends these evils accomplished
into His prehension of a perfectible world.
The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding are dismissed into their triviality of
merely individual facts; and yet the good they did achieve in individual joy, in individual
sorrow, in the introduction of the needed contrast, is yet to be saved by its relation to the
completed whole. The image – and it is but an image – the image under which this
operative growth of God’s nature is best conceived, is that of a tender care that nothing
be lost.80

Regardless of this mere image of tender care, because all evil rests in the necessity of discord, destruction
and elimination are the concrete products of obstruction met within the unfolding of temporal reality, thus
not all things can be saved. All that God can save, He saves. God does what He can in Whitehead’s
theodicy “with infinite patience.”81 This points to the last element of Whitehead’s theodicy I wish to
address. God is all-powerful only in a qualified sense. God cannot do the impossible, i.e., change nature
and what proceeds from it. This is because God is not fully transcendent in Whitehead’s metaphysics, as
discussed previously. God’s nature is wrapped up with all of creation which is governed by logical and
material conditions. Thus, God is also not omnipotent in the classical sense. God saves the totality of
the world in the primordial sense but, since the possibility of evil is unavoidable, God cannot prevent the
occurrence of specific evils, and God’s tender care does not seem to have any conserving force that offers
hope to individuals. In fact, such evils, like all actualities are prehended in God’s creative activity.
Moreover, we must keep in mind that in Whitehead’s metaphysics, God’s prehension does not involve
efficient causation, so in a way God saves the totality of the world in a purely conceptual sense—so the
totality is always good relative to God’s creative development, but specific evils continue to occur and
seem to be part of the process of change that God can only indirectly influence but not prevent. This is an
80
81

Ibid.
Ibid.

87

issue once addressed by process theologian Robert Neville.82 Neville points out that while God does not
limit human freedom or any other finite occasion’s creative activity, it is still difficult to entirely free God
from responsibility for the evils that actually arise in the world, since in Whitehead’s system God is
responsible for contributing to the original concrescence of value that orients the subjective aim of every
occasion. While human beings as such occasions may later modify these aims according to their own
emphasis, God is an external limit on human freedom, just as other external things limit our freedom. As
Neville states, God appears as a mammoth Jewish mother, structuring all possibilities and continually
insisting on values of her own arbitrary choice, i.e. out of the plethora of her own creative largess. Even
the specific evils, while not efficiently caused by God, must be possibilities that are commensurate with
God’s prehensions and unfolding design.
Two points of Whitehead’s theodicy fail to fully escape the horns of the traditional problem of
evil. First, by not distinguishing between moral and natural evils, and treating all evils as a species of
destruction, generically considered, Whitehead fails to consider the peculiar features of moral evil,
namely human volition and responsibility. Since Whitehead’s God at least possesses omniscient
foreknowledge of all possible evils that will ever occur, and is a factor in the actuality of all such
occurrences, this would seem to imply that God affirms at least the joy that the perpetrator experiences
even while he torments his victim. Similarly the negative effects of the evil are also useful to God in the
unfolding of creation since they are a species of necessary change. What consolation does Whitehead
offer to the victims? God salvages what He can, albeit not in the life of the individual victim, but in the
persistence of the universe, its harmony and development. In relation to this, it is not clear that
Whitehead’s distinction between omnipotence within the bounds of logical possibility works in this
context. The qualification of God’s power in this manner seems to imply merely an even more lurid and
complicated version of the trilemma. Since God is wholly immanent and prehends everything that occurs
but does not have the power to prohibit chaotic discord from occasioning real destruction, then this
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implies that God’s prehension is also suspect, since this discord must be among the possibilities that God
conceives. Secondly, if God’s nature unfolds in reality in the manner that Whitehead suggests, it is
therefore difficult not to question God’s omnibenevolence. It would seem that God’s activities are
intimately involved in the subjective aims of the perpetrators of evil, and the suffering of their victims, in
order for the best possible world to actually unfold consummate with God’s nature. This leaves us with
two possibilities in the manner we understand Whitehead’s notion of evil. If evil is real, and not merely
apparent as Whitehead insists, then based on this analysis, it is difficult, if not impossible, to view God as
wholly good. God is wholly good only in the primordial sense—but real evils, especially moral evils, are
bound up with God’s consequent and superject natures. This seems a specious and merely verbal
distinction. God’s nature should be treated as a uniform identity if God is an actual entity as Whitehead
insists. God cannot be omnibenevolent in one part of His nature, while morally ambivalent in other parts
of His nature. If on the other hand we interpret Whitehead to be suggesting that evil is merely apparent,
(and at least part of Whitehead’s theodicy does seem to imply that evil is merely apparent), then we seem
to be confronting a God who has no stake or role in the wake of human suffering.
Thus, Whitehead’s theodicy leaves us with two possible impressions of the nature of God– on the
one hand God is perfect and omnibenevolent—but only in God’s primordial nature from which all
potentialities are perfectible. God is nonetheless not potent enough to manage to save individuals. This
idea is clearly at odds with the traditional doctrine of salvation. On the other hand, there is the God who
in consequent and superject natures is wholly immanent and unfolds in the course of history— and if evil
is real, but ultimately useful in ongoing creation, then this God looks much like the one that makes a
notorious appearance in Hegel’s Philosophy of History, in which individuals are sacrificed on the
butchering block of history.83 The world in its totality
may be saved per hypothesis, and even tend toward perfection in the process of God’s imagination, but
the salvation of even one sufferer is forever a “mere image”, a pleasant fiction of the human imagination,
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that is never consummated in Whitehead’s system in any way that could be meaningful to human
religious experience. Secondly, if we assume that human choice is independent entirely of God’s causal
agency, and we are entirely responsible for all finite occasions of evil as Whitehead insists, then this
would imply that the course of human history is irrelevant to God’s moral character. Put more precisely
God would be amoral and human behavior would be of no concern to God’s pursuit of perfection, since
God is only capable of saving the totality of the process of creation, but can not prevent and does not
compensate for the suffering and loss of individuals. This goes against the traditional view that our
actions matter to God and that God is good in every way, rather than moral goodness being a
metaphysical coincidence of God’s arbitrary creative nature. This is completely at odds with the concept
of sin, for on such a view, the idea that we need to atone for some purpose relevant to God’s plan would
be pointless. On this view God might be better imagined to be a creator who creates solely for
creativity’s sake—while humanity uses the ideas that God prehends for its own ends, even for evil and
destructive purposes. God responds by continuing to paint and sculpt, using the suffering of humanity in
His art, but is oblivious to the moral import of the individual suffering that actually results from such
efforts. If we read Whitehead this way, God appears to be an amoral, oblivious artist.
In closing, if we read Whitehead with the emphasis that all evil is ultimately, merely apparent,
then Whitehead’s approach is merely another instance of attempting to address the trilemma by denying
one of the propositions, and this does not cohere with traditional theology. If we interpret Whitehead
emphasizing his insistence that specific evils are nonetheless real, then we seen to be left with two
possible images of God. At worst Whitehead’s God seems to be either a master butcher, or at best an
oblivious artist. Neither of these two interpretation of Whitehead’s theodicy is reconcilable with
traditional theologies either, but both images seem to me be more appropriate to Whitehead’s notion of
God, than the image of the tender, caring savior that is, moreover in Whitehead’s view, merely a crude
metaphor, “a mere image.”
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